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KING V. HARRIS: DEFINING THE "RELEVANT
AREA" IN SECTION 8 SITE SELECTION
Under the Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments Program,' the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) subsidizes
newly constructed lower-income2 housing.3 In accordance with its
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1437fd1976 & Supp. 1 1977), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-557,
Title II, § 206(d)(1)(e), (f), 92 Stat. 2091 (1978).
2. The statute identifies "lower income families" as those families with income
not exceeding 80% of the local median income. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(O(1) (1976). The
Secretary of HUD may raise or lower the 80% ceiling upon a finding that construction
costs or family incomes in a particular area are extremely high or low. Id.
The Section 8 definition of "lower income families" is consistent with the definition
of "low and moderate income families" in HUD regulations for Title I of the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 653 (codified
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 24 C.F.R. § 570.3(o) (1979).
3. The Section 8 program provides subsidies for existing, newly constructed and
substantially rehabilitated housing. The program is part of Title II of the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974, which revised the United States Housing
Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1437j (1976 & Supp. 1 1977), as amended by Pub. L.
No 95-557, Title I1 § 206(a)-(g) and Title IV, § 412, 92 Stat. 2091 (1978); Pub. L. No.
95-619, Title II, § 25 l(a), 92 Stat. 3235 (1978). For the HUD regulations for Section 8
newly constructed housing, see 24 C.F.R. § 880 (1979).
The statutory purpose of the Section 8 program is to aid "lower income families in
obtaining a decent place to live and [to promote] economically mixed housing." 42
U.S.C. § 1437f(a)(1976).
Section 8 provides assistance to the owner or prospective owner of a building by
compensating for the percentage of rent due above and beyond what the lower in-
come tenant is required to pay. The tenant's rent may not exceed 25% of his gross
income. The total rent (tenant's cost plus HUD compensation) may not usually equal
more than 10% over the fair market rental for the unit as established by HUD. 42
U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(1), (c)(3)(1976). At least 30% of the assisted units are reserved for
famihes that earn no more than 50% of the local median income. Id. § 1437f(f)(2),
(c)(7).
Predecessor legislation to Section 8 in the field of subsidized rental public housing
includes the Section 23 program of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-117, Title I, § 103(a), 79 Stat. 455 (omitted as superseded by Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, Title II, § 201(a))
(allowing local housing authorities to lease units in private buildings and release them
to qualified tenants); and the Section 236 program of the Housing and Development
Act of 1968, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977), as amended by Pub. L. No.
95-406, § l(e), 92 Stat. 879 (1978); Pub. L. No. 95-557, Title II, § 201(i), Title III,
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statutory duty to promote integration in housing,4 HUD examines a
relevant area encompassing a proposed project site to avoid subsi-
dizing housing which would perpetuate minority or low-income con-
centration.' To aid the examination, HUD proposed regulations in
1977 authorizing it to use the census tract surrounding the project site
§ 301(e), 92 Stat. 2087, 2096 (1978) (allowing apartment owners to receive mortgage
subsidies for new construction from the federal government in exchange for a promise
to keep rents below a ceiling set by the government). The legislative history of Sec-
tion 8 indicates it is in part a modified extension of the Section 23 program, reflecting
HUD's desire for a "direct cash assistance approach" to subsidized housing. S. REP.
No. 693, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4314-
17.
For general discussions of Section 8 and the above programs, see Friedman and
Krier, 4 New Lease on Life: Section 23 Housing and the Poor, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 611
(1968); Note, Housing the Poor under the Section 8 New Construction Program, 15
URBAN L. ANN. 281 (1978); Note, Federal Leased Housing Assistance in Private Ac-
commodations: Section 8, 8 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 676 (1975).
4. See Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 801, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1976), which states: "It
is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair
housing throughout the United States." See also Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (1976): "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance."
The 1968 statute requires HUD to carry out the fair housing policies. 42 U.S.C.
§ 3608(d)(5) (1976). These policies, in conjunction with the concept of spatial decon-
centration, discussed in note 21 infra, have developed into an obligation for public
agencies to promote racial and economic integration in housing. Regarding racial
integration, see Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973)
(policy of accommodating present or former site occupants in public housing project
should be suspended when it violates the housing authority's duty to integrate); Banks
v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972), affdinpart, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973)
(where a high percentage of those on waiting list for federally subsidized housing are
black, housing authority's failure to put most new projects in white areas violates
federal public housing and civil rights statutes); Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d
Cir. 1970) (change in urban renewal plan from owner occupied to rental units based
on land use factors only, and with no study of the effect on racial concentration,
violated 1949 Housing Act and 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights acts).
5. The present regulations establishing site selection criteria for Section 8 newly
constructed housing state that:
Proposed sites for new construction projects must be approved by HUD as
meeting the following standards:
(b) The site and neighborhood shall be suitable from the standpoint of facili-
tating and furthering full compliance with the applicable provisions of Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968..
and HUD regulations issued pursuant thereto.
(c) The site shall not be located in:
(1) An area of minority concentration unless (i) sufficient, comparable oppor-
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as the relevant area.6 In King v. Harris,7 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York declared that using the
census tract to define the area, without considering local social and
economic factors, violates the federal housing policies of integration
and antidiscrimination.8
In 1977, HUD approved a private developer's proposal to build
tunities exist for housing for minority families, in the income range to be served
by the proposed project, outside areas of minority concentration ....
(2) A racially mixed area if the project will cause a significant increase in the
proportion of minority to nonminority residents in the area.
(d) The site shall promote greater choice of housing opportunities and avoid
undue concentration of assisted persons in areas containing a high proportion of
low income persons.
24 C.F.R. § 880.112(b)-(d) (1979). These regulations were enacted in 1976, 41 Fed.
Reg 17473 (1976), and amended in 1977, 42 Fed. Reg. 17110 (1977). Proposed rules
for the Section 8 new construction program would reclassify these regulations to 24
C.F.R. § 880.206. See 44 Fed. Reg. 33804 (1979). While these proposed rules do not
change the substance of the regulations, comments published with them indicate that
revisions to the site selection rules have been published for comment. Presumably
this reference is to the proposed site selection regulations cited in note 6 infra.
For project selection criteria for HUD programs in general, see 24 C.F.R.
§§ 200.700-710 (1979).
6. Site and Neighborhood Standards for Subsidized Newly-Constructed or Sub-
stantially Rehabilitated Housing, 42 Fed. Reg. 4299 (1977), proposed as 24 C.F.R.
§ 200.704, but never enacted. The section reads in part:
(a) Determination of minority concentration or racial mixture. In furtherance of
the objectives of the statutes and the Executive Order enumerated in this section
[the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, the Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act of 1974 and Executive Order 11063 . . .] HUD shall determine:
(1) Whether the site is in an area of minority concentration. In making such
determination, the area to be considered shall be the census tract
m which the site is located or such other area for which reliable data as to
racial composition is available and which HUD determines, on the basis of
functional considerations (i.e. location of neighborhood facilities such as
schools, shopping centers, etc.) to be more appropriate. An area shall be deter-
mined to be an area of minority concentration if minority residents constitute
(i) more than 40 percent of the residents of the area or (ii) a significantly
greater proportion of the residents of the area than the proportion of minority
residents of the locality as a whole.
42 Fed. Reg. 4299 (1977).
7. 464 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. N.Y. 1979), aff'd sub. nom. King v. Faymor Dev. Co.,
mem., 614 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 100 S. Ct.
1828 (1980), in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Strycker's Bay Neighborhood
Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 100 S. Ct. 497 (1980).
8. Id. at 839-40. The court suggested some model considerations. See text ac-
companying note 49 infra. Nevertheless, the court would not require specific guide-
lines for the agency, refusing to impede HUD's administrative discretion. See notes
14 & 73 and accompanying text infra.
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low-income housing on Staten Island, New York under the Section 8
program.9 Various groups and individuals, objecting to the propo-
sal,'° sued to enjoin construction of the project. On remand to HUD
for further consideration, HUD reapproved the project, using the
census tract encompassing the project site to determine minority con-
centration." The Eastern District subsequently enjoined HUD from
using federal funds for the project, holding that HUD violated its
duty to promote integration.' 2 Project approval not only would in-
crease the volume of low-income housing in an area already inun-
dated with such housing, but it also would cause the area to "tip" out
of racial and economic balance, resulting in accelerated deteriora-
tion.' 3  The court found abuse of administrative discretion' 4 by
9. HUD previously had considered co-defendant Faymor Development's propo-
sal for housing for the elderly at the same location. 464 F. Supp. at 831. Two of the
six HUD divisions that review project proposals, the Equal Opportunity (EO) and
Housing Management (HM) divisions, objected to that proposal, concluding that it
would create an undue concentration of subsidized housing in the area. Id. All but
the Economic and Market Analysis Division (EMAD), however, deemed the proposal
at issue in King acceptable. EMAD had similar reservations as HM and EO had
concerning the elderly project. It also criticized the use of 1970 census tract data as
not reflective of present conditions. See note I 1 infra.
10. Plaintiffs were Evelyn King, President of the Staten Island branch of the
NAACP; Donald Asinobi and Amelia Hall, both of the Clifton Homeowners Associa-
tion; Cynthia Mailman and Helen Rose of the Stapleton Civil Association; and Louis
Wein of the Clayton Homeowners Association. Each sued as individuals and as orga-
nizational representatives. .d. at 827.
11. Id. at 832. The proposed project, Tenhill, was to be at a site in census tract 29,
about 300 feet from tract 40 and adjacent to tract 27. A project called Stapleton
Houses largely dominated tract 29; tract 40 encompassed five other complexes with
high minority populations, all of which were near the proposed site. Id. at 833.
Despite acknowledgment in HUD's report of an increased concentration of low-
income and minority residents since 1970, HUD looked only to census tract 29, to
determine the relevant area. Id. at 832. For example, by 1978 the Stapleton Houses
project had a minority population of 74.9%; also by 1978, four of the census tract 40
complexes had a combined minority population of 61.9%. Id. at 833 n.15. The mi-
nority population in Stapleton Houses alone, in relation to the total 1978 population
of census tract 29, made the minority population in that tract more than 43%, a figure
above the minimum percentage required under HUD's proposed regulations for an
area to be considered concentrated. See note 6 supra.
12. 464 F. Supp. at 839, 840, 845.
13. Id. at 841-44. See notes 27-30 and accompanying text infra.
14. Id. at 839-40. The scope of review for HUD decisions is based upon the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976), which states in part, "the reviewing
court shall. . .(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency actions, findings and conclu-
[Vol. 19:303
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HUD's use of the census tract alone to define the relevant area.15
Since 1949, the federal government has actively supported racial
integration in housing."6 The Civil Rights Acts of 1964"7 and 196818
facilitate that support through antidiscrimination and open housing
policies. 9 As an extension of this policy, the Housing and Commu-
nity Development Act of 197420 attempts economic integration in an
effort to disperse low-income housing.2'
In compliance with the statutorily defined racial and economic in-
tegration policies, HUD has promulgated various regulations which
establish standards for project site selection.2" Notwithstanding the
sions found to be-(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law."
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), the
Supreme Court indicated that the standard for judicial review of administrative ac-
tions is a narrow one; as long as a decision was "based on a consideration of the
relevant factors," the court may not impose its own judgment. Id. at 416. See City of
Lebanon v. HUD, 422 F. Supp. 803 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (review of HUD decision to
subsidize elderly housing is extremely narrow).
The relevant factors which an agency must consider include any statutory require-
ments. See Schick v. Romney, 474 F.2d 309 (7th Cir. 1973) (informal agency action
which doesn't comply with statutory requirements may be set aside). See also the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976), which places the
requirement on federal agencies to consider possible environmental effects of their
actions.
15. 464 F. Supp. at 839-40.
16. See Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413 (codified in various sections of
12, 42 U.S.C.). which requires the government to encourage "the development of
well-planned, integrated residential neighborhoods." 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
18. Id. §§ 3601-3631.
19. See note 4 supra.
20. Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C.).
21. The statute calls for the revitalization of deteriorated neighborhoods, and the
"spatial deconcentration of housing opportunities" for low-income persons. 42
U.S.C. § 5301(c)(6) (1976). See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) (remedy or-
dering dispersal of public housing throughout metropolitan area permissible for vio-
lation of federal integration policy that occurred inside central city); City of Hartford
v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1976) (HUD approval of a city's application for
grants under Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, without appraisal
of number of low- and moderate-income persons expected to reside in area, held arbi-
trary and capricious). See generally City of Hartford v. Towns of Glastonbury, 561
F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1976) (relation of deconcentration policy to expected to reside
figures); See also Warren, "Spatial Deconcentration:" A Problem Greater than School
Desegregation, 29 AD. L. REv. 577 (1977).
22. See 24 C.F.R. § 880.112 (1979) and discussion at note 5 supra. As early as
1967, HUD implemented rules for site approval for low-rent housing, using Title VI
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apparent legality of the regulations, courts have declared the agency's
administrative actions inconsistent with the federal policies. 23 In
Shannon v. HUD,24 the Third Circuit held that changing the type of
proposed housing in an urban renewal area from owner occupied to
rental, without considering the effect on racial concentration, violated
the 1964 and 1968 civil rights statutes.25 Under the court's ruling,
HUD no longer could approve projects that would perpetuate minor-
ity concentration in an area and eventually result in urban blight.26
Similar analyses led to the adoption of the "tipping" doctrine in
Otero v. New York City Housing Authority.27 Initially this doctrine
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976); later, Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1976), also served as statutory authority. See,
e.g., Department of Housing and Urban Development, Low-RENT HOUSING HAND-
BOOK, RHA 7401.1 (1969). See also 24 C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(2)(i), (ii) (1979), placing re-
sponsibility on those agencies administering federally funded housing programs to
comply with the objectives of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in selecting housing type and
location. The court in Croskey Street Concerned Citizens v. Romney, 335 F. Supp.
1251 (E.D. Pa. 1971), a,/'d 459 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1972), discussed the effect of this
regulation. See note 31 infra.
In 1969 the new Secretary of HUD, George Romney, ordered new site selection
regulations. These rules were published twice for comment. 36 Fed. Reg. 12032-38,
19316-20 (1971). HUD adopted the regulations in final form in 1972. Evaluation of
Rent-Supplement Projects and Low-Rent Housing Assistance Applications, 37 Fed.
Reg. 203 (1972). These regulations, now superseded by the regulations discussed be-
low, were a response not only to Romney's initiative, but also to indications by courts
that HUD should establish fixed criteria for site selection and approval. See notes 31-
34 and accompanying text infra. For a criticism of the 1972 regulations, see Maxwell,
HUD's Project Selection Criteria-A Cure for "'Impermissible Color Blindness"?, 48
NOTRE DAME LAW. 92 (1972). See also Comment, 7 URBAN L. ANN. 336 (1974).
More recently, HUD assembled comprehensive regulations regarding project selec-
tion, in the form of an evaluation checklist for prospective projects. See 24 C.F.R.
§ 200.710 (1979). Compare these regulations with the regulations at 24 C.F.R.
§ 880.112 (1979), discussed in note 5 supra. The two sets of regulations coexist, and
both exhibit the federal policy of deconcentration.
23. See notes 25-31 and accompanying text infra.
24. 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
25. Id. at 820-21. The court considered land use, but not racial or social factors.
26. Id. See WARREN, supra note 21.
27. 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973). The Otero court described the "tipping" point
of an area as the "percentage of concentration of nonwhite residents in a given area
that will cause white residents to flee." Id. at 1135. The notion of "tipping" was
further amplified in Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044
(S.D. N.Y. 1974), modfed, 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1975). The district court established
three criteria for determining if an area will tip: (I) the numbers of minority or other
families which will likely affect the area in an adverse manner; (2) the quality of area
facilities and services; and (3) the majority residents' attitudes as to the first two crite-
(Vol. 19:303
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described the increase in minority concentration caused by acceler-
ated majority flight and subsequent deterioration.28 Courts more re-
cently have extended "tipping" to include low-income concentrations
as well.29 Regardless of whether a project will cause a neighborhood
ria, which might influence their decision to remain in or leave the area. 387 F. Supp.
at 1066.
28. The tipping doctrine evolved from a line of cases holding that building a pro-
ject which will result in a disproportionate increase in minority concentration in an
area is unacceptable under federal guidelines. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v.
Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044, 1064 (S.D. N.Y. 1974). Cases leading up to Trinity in-
clude Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970), discussed in note 21 supra,,
Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972), afldinpart, 473 F.2d 910 (6th
Cir. 1973) (where low-income projects were built only in predominantly black census
tracts, the court ordered future construction in white areas); Blackshear Residents
Organization v. Housing Auth. of City of Austin, 337 F. Supp. 1138 (W.D. Tex. 1971)
(since procedures to choose and approve project site were inadequate, construction
was enjoined until the area was shown not to be one of minority concentration).
Some school desegregation cases reflect a different view, ie., that the resulting pos-
sibility of majority emigration does not justify municipality's failure to carry out a
court order of desegregation. See, e.g., United States v. Scotland Neck Bd. of Educ.,
407 U.S. 484 (1972) and Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968) (both
involved resistance to a court ordered duty to integrate). But see Higgins v. Board of
Educ., 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974), where the court said that a school board formu-
lating a voluntary desegregation plan may take the probability of "white flight" into
consideration. Id. at 794. Both points of view were recognized in Parent Ass'n of
Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1979). The court
distinguished Higgins from Monroe and Scotland Neck on the voluntary/involuntary
basis. Id. at 719. The court then likened the "tipping" point considerations discussed
in this note and in note 25 supra to the voluntary integrative actions applied by the
school board in Higgins. Id at 720.
It is questionable whether that analogy was proper. Courts require involuntary
desegregation when the municipality or school board affirmatively caused all or part
of the segregation. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977)
(test for imposing remedial decree upon school board requires (1) proof of segregative
intent on the part of the school board; (2) a showing that such intent caused a segrega-
tive effect; and (3) a remedy geared toward correcting any incremental segregative
effect resulting from step 2, ie., from governmentally caused segregation). But see
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, reh. denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979)
(Court may impose an affirmative duty to integrate schools regardless of past school
board action). If HUD has an affirmative duty to integrate via statutory directive, its
responsibility to do so is as strong as the constitutional duty to cure state-imposed
school segregation. The court in A4mbach may have erred, therefore, in analogizing
the "tipping" doctrine only to voluntary desegregation cases.
29. In King, the court stated that the court in Trinity failed to recognize an eco-
nomic "tipping" doctrine only because plaintiffs did not prove a correlation between
minority and low-income populations. 464 F. Supp. at 844. But the court in King
was willing to let a showing of such a correlation support a "tipping" approach. Id.
For a discussion of the theory of economic "tipping", see Note, Economic Tipping: An
Approach to a Balanced Neighborhood, 4 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 167 (1975).
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to "tip," a high concentration of minority or low-income persons is
inconsistent with federal policies. 30
Such court decisions forced HUD to consider racial and socioeco-
nomic factors in its site selection process. In Shannon, the court
called on HUD to adopt an "institutionalized method" to examine
these factors. 3 ' Having developed standardized methods, the Depart-
30. This view is consistent with the "spatial deconcentration" theory of the Hous-
ing and Community Development Act of 1974, as the cases in note 21 supra demon-
strate. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) also has served as a
basis for deciding low-income concentrations. See Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39 (2d
Cir. 1978) rev'dsub nom., Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 100
S. Ct. 497 (1980), a case spawned by the Second Circuit's remand in Trinity. In re-
jecting a site proposal for a public housing project, the court reasoned that building a
high rise apartment for low-income tenants in an area where a large percentage of
low-income housing already existed, constituted unacceptable concentration. The
court said that, "tipping" aside, the concentration created by such construction would
violate the policies established in NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976). 590 F.2d at 43.
While Karlen and Trinity dealt with the provisions of NEPA and their effects on
concentration, the King court did not reach the NEPA issue. In a footnote, however,
the court referred to plaintiffs' post-trial memorandum and its claim that HUD vio-
lated NEPA by approving the project. Plaintiffs asserted that despite HUD's claim
that NEPA was inapplicable, HUD was indeed bound by the Act. See Trinity Epis-
copal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D. N.Y. 1974), modfled, 523
F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1975) (NEPA encompasses quality of urban life and environment);
Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972) (jail construction enjoined pending
General Services Administration determination of whether the jail would signifi-
cantly affect environment). See generally Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.
1972) (establishes considerations for determining if agency action will significantly
affect environment); Note, HUD's NEP4 Responsibilities Under the Housing and Com.
munity Development Act of 1974: Delegation or Derogation?, 10 URBAN L. ANN. 179
(1975) (discussing HUD's ability under the statute to give the basic responsibility for
enforcing NEPA to grantee cities and counties). See also 24 C.F.R. § 880.208(e)(5)
(1979), requiring HUD compliance with rules that list thresholds the agency must use
to determine which projects will significantly affect quality of environment.
31. 436 F.2d at 821. The court suggested some considerations it would deem
proper in analyzing the effect of site selection. These included the local public hous-
ing authority's analysis of effects on concentration, prospective tenant selection meth-
ods, present location of low-income housing, and alternative sites for the proposed
project. Id. at 821-22.
In Croskey Street Concerned Citizens v. Romney, 335 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Pa.
1971), afg'd, 459 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1972), the court said that HUD did consider the
factors relevant to racial concentration. HUD regulations precluded the agency from
approving housing in areas of racial concentration unless "alternative or additional
sites in other areas provide a balanced distribution of the proposed housing." 24
C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(2)(i). The agency approved a site for elderly housing in a concen-
trated area noting that HUD had analyzed the racial composition of the area, had
provided that projects would also be located outside concentrated areas, and had de-
termined that elderly housing in concentrated areas is more integrated than the sur-
(Vol, 19:303
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ment had sometimes managed to shield itself from judicial review. In
Jones i,. Tully,32 HUD allowed a project in a predominantly black
area after considering the factors relevant to concentration.33 Since
HUD had acted within its administrative discretion, the court refused
to substitute its own judgment for the agency's34 and upheld HUD's
action.
While Shannon and Jones considered the effects of site selection on
minority and low-income concentration,3 5 only one court prior to
King addressed the specific issue of relevant area definition.36 In
Blackshear Residents Organization v. Housing Authority of the City of
Austin,3 7 the district court held that HUD failed to consider federal
antidiscrimination and open housing objectives when it had ap-
proved a project site.38 Consistent with other site selection cases,39
the court interpreted HUD's regulations to require an analysis of the
effects site would have on concentration. 4' For that analysis, the
Blackshear court suggested guidelines to define the relevant area by
rounding area. These considerations, the court stated, satisfied the requirements
imposed by the two civil rights acts and by the Shannon case. 335 F. Supp. at 1255-
57. Also see Marin City Council v. Marin City Redevel. Agency, 416 F. Supp. 707
(N.D. Cal. 1976) (agency's procedures apparently were adequate means of examining
relevant factors in excluding further subsidized housing from city).
32 378 F, Supp. 286 (E.D. N.Y. 1974), af'd510 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1975).
33, 378 F. Supp. at 292-93. The court and evidently HUD believed that certain
factors may "outweigh the disadvantages of racial concentration," and that "low in-
come housing and racial concentration at a particular site are not mutually exclusive
ifjustified by the relevant housing factors." Id. at 293. Here the apparent relevant
factors were the need for both more low-income housing in the area and the rehabili-
tation of a blighted neighborhood. Id Compare these rationales with the exceptions
in the HUD regulations which allow sites in concentrated areas. See note 5 supra.
34. 378 F. Supp. at 292-93. The court followed the Volpe and Schicke approaches
discussed in note 14 supra.
35. See notes 21 & 27-30 supra.
36. Blackshear Residents Organization v. Housing Auth. of City of Austin, 347 F.
Supp. 1138 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1148.
39. See notes 31-34 supra.
40. 347 F. Supp. at 1145-46. HUD's regulations at the time did not allow the
location of federally financed public housing in a racially concentrated area without
an actual showing that no acceptable sites exist outside the area. The court cited
HUD's Low RENT HousING PRECONSTRUCTION HANDBOOK, RHA 7410.1, Chap. 1,
§ l(2)(g). Since the regulation was the agency's interpretation of the civil rights laws,
the court held HUD's administrative actions "judicially reviewable under the stan-
dard" set forth in the regulations. 347 F. Supp. at 1147.
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considering the proximity of the project site to community facilities
serving local residents.4
Relying only partially on Blackshear, the court in King cited sev-
eral groups of cases to support its holding. The first group was school
desegregation cases in which the courts stressed the importance of ad
hoc determinations in framing effective remedies for dejure segrega-
tion.42 Although the King court used this broad doctrine merely to
point out the value of considering relevant social factors, one case
provides a close parallel to King. 3 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education" involved a segregated school system character-
ized by high concentrations of black students.4" The Supreme Court,
in ordering further desegregation, held local authorities and the dis-
trict court responsible for the prevention of new school construction
tending to encourage segregation.a6
In addition to applying analyses from the school desegregation
41. Id. at 1148-49. Some of the facilities the court referred to were schools, parks,
hospitals, libraries and community centers. Id Compare the use of community facili-
ties by the Blackshear court in defining the relevant area with HUD's proposed site
selection regulations, supra note 6.
The court's "definition" of relevant area was only one of several factors the court
suggested HUD might consider in determining effects on concentration. The other
factors were similar to those the Shannon court listed. See note 31 supra,
Although other cases have stated the need for a "relevant area" determination, they
have done so in a more general fashion than the Blackshear court. Cf. Otero v. New
York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1137 (2d Cir. 1973) (parties may introduce
evidence necessary to ascertain the "relevant community" for purposes of discovering
whether "tipping" will occur); Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F.
Supp. 1044, 1066-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (district court used such evidence as the Otero
court discussed in its "tipping" consideration). The Trinity court accepted the West
Side renewal district as the relevant area, but qualified its acceptance by stating that
the relevant community must be "measured against some standard or norm." Id. at
1066. The court did not elaborate upon the factors a court might use to establish such
a norm; nevertheless, an official of the New York City Housing Authority testified
that a norm is necessary.
42. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), rehearing
denied, 403 U.S. 912 (1971); Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent, 391 U.S. 430
(1968).
43. See King v. Harris, 464 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. N.Y. 1979).
44. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), rehearing
denied, 403 U.S. 912 (1971).
45. The Fourth Circuit approved the district court's desegregation plan for the
secondary schools in question, but vacated and remanded on the issue of remedy
regarding the elementary schools. The Supreme Court reinstated the district court's
order in its entirety. 402 U.S. at 31.
46. The Court stated that school location may influence residential development
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area, the King court adopted a general "relevant factor" analysis for
housing, implying a strong correlation between neighborhood defini-
tion and the achievement of residential integration.47 Since neigh-
borhood definition requires consideration of many unique abstract
factors, the court mandated an ad hoc definition in each case.4 8 Ele-
ments which might enter the consideration include common public
facilities, shared perceptions, social and economic status of residents,
and physical and ephemeral boundaries.49
The King court reinforced its argument by explaining that courts
50
in an urban area and may have a strong impact on the make-up of inner-city neigh-
borhoods. Id. at 20-21.
In reaching its conclusion, the Swann court relied on Green v. County School Bd.
of New Kent, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). Green involved a freedom-of-choice school pro-
gram which the lower court found maintained a dual system. Overturning the school
board's plan, the Court stated that each desegregation case must promise "immediate
progress," and that the lower courts should consider if that goal has been reached "in
light of the facts at hand and in light of any alternatives which may be shown as
feasible and more promising in their effectiveness." (Emphasis added) Id. at 439.
47. King v. Harris, 464 F. Supp. 827, 839 (E.D. N.Y. 1979).
48. Id. at 839, 841.
49 Id. at 839.
50. Gautreaux v. City of Chicago, 480 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1144 (1974) (metropolitan area remedy for segregation in inner city); Henry v.
Clarksdale Mun. Separate School Dist., 409 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 940 (1969) (school zone boundaries maintaining segregated system were held
impermissible); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Pa. 1976),
modofed 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977) ("freedom-of-choice" housing plan which led in
practice to concentration of public housing in black areas was invalid); Blackshear
Residents Organization v. Housing Auth. of City of Austin, 347 F. Supp. 1138 (W.D.
Tex. 1972), discussed in notes 31-34 and accompanying text supra; Banks v. Perk, 341
F Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972), affld in part, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973) (history of
locating public housing in predominantly black census tracts was inconsistent with
national housing policy).
Gautreaux is one of several cases extending from the same nucleus of facts. Claim-
ing the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) site selection process for public housing
was unconstitutional, black tenants in and applicants for that housing sued HUD and
CHA in separate lawsuits. In 1969, the district court upheld plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment in the CHA suit, finding the CHA violated plaintiffs' constitu-
tional rights by choosing sites on the basis of race. Gautreaux v. CHA, 296 F. Supp.
907 (N.D. Il. 1969). The court ordered CHA to build a certain number and percent-
age of public housing units in white areas. Ignoring the city's boundaries, the court
included the Chicago metropohtan area in the remedial plan. Gautreaux v. CHA,
304 F. Supp. 736, 738-39 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
The court grouped Henry, a school desegregation case, with the cases ignoring ex-
isting boundaries. The Henry court held that as long as all-black or all-white schools
exist, the desegregation plan was unconstitutional, and the local school board must
redraw its attendance zone boundaries. 409 F.2d at 690. Ignoring existing bounda-
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often ignore existing physical and designated boundaries in defining
the relevant area for integration. In Banks v. Perk,5 the local hous-
ing authority consistently built projects in census tracts having prima-
rily black populations. 2 Devising a remedy to disperse public
housing,53 the court ordered the authority to compensate for its past
actions by building projects in predominantly white areas.5 4 The
Supreme Court reaffirmed the goal of dispersion in Hills v. Gau-
treaux." Since both HUD and the local housing authority had re-
gional jurisdiction, the Court upheld a remedial order which
ries, however, especially in the desegregation context, is merely one application of the
ad hoc determination doctrine. See notes 42-46 and accompanying text supra.
The Henry court cited Braxton v. Board of Pub. Instruction of Duval, 303 F. Supp.
958 (M.D. Fla. 1967), for the proposition that school boards may not use zone bound-
aries which maintain segregated school sytems. 409 F.2d at 690. Accord, United
States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1972) (where attendance zones
were drawn sending almost all students to schools where they composed either a large
racial majority or a small racial minority, court made the school board abandon its
present system).
51. 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972), a ffidinpart, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973).
52. Id. The court held that the local housing authority and the city, by allowing
revocation of permits for projects in predominantly white areas, denied plaintiffs
equal protection. 341 F. Supp. at 1179. The court in King v. Harris did not reach a
constitutional issue, nor was one presented by the parties. For a case which explicitly
considered the constitutionality of site selection, see Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp.
619 (E.D. La. 1969). The court in Hicks said that where the purpose for choosing a
particular site was to perpetuate segregation, HUD approval of the site violated not
only the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but also the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 623.
53. 341 F. Supp. at 1184. The court acknowledged that "dispersal" was suscepti-
ble of many definitions. The definition the court adopted was "that if historically
housing has been built primarily in one area or section of the city, housing must be
built in other areas or sections of the city until such time as all the public housing in
the city is dispersed." Id Compare Banks with Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 425
F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Pa. 1976), modfied, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977) (housing authority
had an affirmative duty to work toward dispersing public housing).
54. 341 F. Supp. 1175, 1184. It is unclear which "boundary" the King court per-
ceived in the Banks situation. It is likely the boundaries in question were census tract
divisions, since, by the end of 1964, nine of I 1 public housing estates in the city of
Cleveland reflected the racial composition of the surrounding census tracts. 341 F.
Supp. at 1181.
For a school case analogous to Banks, see Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 99 S.
Ct. 2941 (1979) (Supreme Court approved lower court's reliance on board's school site
selection and construction patterns in finding school system segregated).
55. 425 U.S. 284 (1976). This is the parallel case to Gautreaux v. City of Chicago,
discussed in note 50 supra. In another Gautreaux case, after the district court origi-
nally granted HUD's motion for dismissal, the Seventh Circuit reversed and ordered
summary judgment for plaintiffs on the grounds that HUD violated the Fifth Amend-
ment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by supporting CHA's program. Gautreaux v.
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transcended the boundaries of the offending city.56 Dispersing low-
income housing throughout the metropolitan market would, accord-
ing to the Gautreax Court, best fulfill the goal of integration. 5
7
The court in King thus borrowed doctrine from several lines of
cases to argue that the isolated use of census tracts constituted an
abuse of HUD's administrative discretion.58 The defendants argued
to the contrary, that previous agency reliance on census tract data
should similarly allow reliance by HUD in the King situation.59 The
court refuted that argument on two grounds. First, defendants did
not prove such reliance; the local HUD field office did not agree upon
the appropriate criteria to apply.' Second, the court clarified that it
was not eliminating census tract analysis as a tool for defining the
relevant area; rather, it held that using census tract data alone is in-
sufficient.6 '
By adopting an adhoc test to define a relevant area62 and by refus-
Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 739-40 (7th Cir. 1973). The case again was remanded and
eventually reached the Supreme Court m the decision discussed in notes 56-57 infra.
56. 425 U.S. 284, 293-95 (1976). The decision dealt with the effect of Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), on remedies directed toward a broader area than the
violating municipality. In Milliken, the Court overturned a plan incorporating school
districts throughout metropolitan Detroit in a remedy for discrimination in the central
city. Local autonomy was a major reason in the Court's holding. 418 U.S. at 738-40.
In Hills. the Court only viewed Milliken as a bar in situations where no constitutional
violation had occurred. The Hills Court found that HUD violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. 425 U.S. at 297.
57. 425 U.S. at 299-300. The Court said that HUD acknowledged this type of
metropolitan market analysis, citing HUD's FHA TECHNIQUES OF HOUSING MAR-
KET ANALYSIS 13 (January 1970). 425 U.S. at 300.
58. See notes 42-57 and accompanying text supra.
59. King v. Harris, 464 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. N.Y. 1979). See, e.g., Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 6, 25 (1969) (a long standing construction of a statute is "entitled to
great weight"); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (court shows "great deference"
toward agency interpretation of statute); Kenai Peninsula Borough v. Andrus, 436 F.
Supp. 288, 291 (D. Alaska 1977) (long standing, practical interpretation of statute by
executive officers who administer it is "strong evidence of meaning"). But see Fletch-
er v. Housing Auth. of Louisville, 491 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1974). The court in Fletcher
held that to the extent a local regulation conflicts with a housing authority's duty to
integrate, the regulation must yield. Id. at 798.
60. 464 F. Supp. at 840. Plaintiffs-appellees stated in their brief that conflict arose
between HUD's experts as to which criteria to apply. The EO specialist believed that
the census tract was the only datum he was allowed to consider. The director of the
HUD Office of Program Standards testified that the agency's policy did not preclude
looking at other data besides the census tract. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 23.
61. 464 F. Supp. at 839-40.
62. See notes 36-41 and accompanying text supra.
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ing to sanction construction which would accelerate minority- or low-
income concentration within the relevant area, 63 the King court con-
sistently reasserted HUD's duty to promote integration in public
housing.64 The decision is also consistent with sociological and eco-
nomic analyses65 by urban geographers who have studied residents'
perceptions of their neighborhoods, 66 and have used these percep-
tions to construct models for community planning and develop-
ment.67 Economic studies of neighborhoods indicate that blight and
disinvestment do not fit within the lines drawn by census tract divi-
sions.68
As King rejects methods which fail to consider relevant features of
the particular project area,69 the proposed site selection regulations
violate King to the extent they allow HUD to define an area by the
63. Cf., Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972), a 'd in part, rep'din
part, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973).
64. See notes 5 & 23-29 and accompanying text supra.
65. See Hunter, The Urban Neighborhood- Its Analytical and Social Contexts, 14
URB. AFF. Q. 267 (1979).
66. See A. RICHMAN & F. CHAPIN, A REVIEW OF THE SOCIAL AND PHYSICAL
CONCEPTS OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD AS A BASIS FOR PLANNING RESIDENTIAL ENVI-
RONMENTS (1977); R. DOwNS & D. STEA, IMAGE AND ENVIRONMENT: COGNITIVE
MAPPING AND SPATIAL BEHAVIOR (1973); UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH, GRADUATE
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INT'L AFFAIRS, PERCEPTION OF THE HOUSING ENVIRON-
MENT: A COMPARISON OF RACIAL AND DENSITY PREFERENCES (1971); Ladd, Black
Youths View Their Environment, 2 ENVIRONMENT & BEHAVIOR 74 (1970). See gener-
ally K. LYNCH, THE IMAGE OF THE CITY (1960).
67. Two of the studies cited in note 66 supra are especially helpful in understand-
ing how planners explore and apply people's perceptions of their environments. The
Pittsburgh study presents an excellent social science construct of the actual process of
perception, and then applies the analysis to a number of variables in the neighbor-
hood context, e.g., life styles, familial ties, social stratification, and housing densities.
The Richman and Chapin study, on the other hand, relies more on the work of prom-
inent planning analysts, and uses their work on neighborhood structure as a spring-
board for their own approach to residential planning. People's perceptions, however,
also play an important part in their study. See A. RICHMAN & E. CHAPIN, supra note
66, at 7-17.
68. See Werner, Frej & Madway, Redlining and Disinvestment: Causes, Conse-quences, and Proposed Remedies, 10 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 501 (1976). See generally
M. STEGMAN, HOUSING INVESTMENT IN THE INNER CITY: THE DYNAMICS OF DE-
CLINE (1972).
69. 464 F. Supp. 827, 839 (E.D. N.Y. 1979). "While census tracts may provide
HUD with a general indication of residential patterns, they are inadequate as the sole
indicators of the racial or economic composition of housing in a neighborhood." Id.
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surrounding census tract.70  The regulations, however, also allow
HUD to use as an alternative method, an area for which racial com-
position data is available, and which HUD determines is appropriate
in light of "functional considerations.' Such a test might well re-
main consistent with King.
King's consistency with strong national policy should win the hold-
ing further judicial support.72 Nevertheless, the case may create
problems on two levels. First, HUD is likely to argue that the ambi-
guity of the King decision, by failing to require specific criteria for
defining the relevant area, may leave the agency open to attacks on
its administrative discretion. 73 The typical limitation on that discre-
tion, arbitrariness and capriciousness, 74 however, will be exercised
only if HUD ignores the federal housing policies in making its deci-
sions. 75 The importance of King may be to effectuate HUD's exami-
nation of social and economic indicia when determining the make-up
of a relevant area.
More generally, the case questions the use of census tracts and cen-
sus data in administrative decisionmaking. HUD and other agencies
use the data to obtain information about neighborhoods and commu-
nities because it is reliable and administratively convenient to do
70. Compare the proposed regulations, supra note 6, with the court's comment
cited in note 64 supra.
71. Proposed Regulation 24 C.F.R. § 200.704(1), 42 Fed. Reg. 4299 (1977).
72. The Second Circuit has consistently supported policies of integration, decon-
centration and dispersal of public housing. See, e.g., Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39
(2d Cir. 1978) (building low-income project in area with high percentage of low-in-
come persons violates deconcentration policy); Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth.,
484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973) (policy of providing space for former site occupants must
be suspended when it violates housing authority's duty to integrate); Trinity Episco-
pal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D. N.Y. 1974), mod led, 523 F.2d
88 (2d Cir. 1975) (building project in area already mainly low-income violates policy
of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969).
73. But the agency's discretion has been recognized as extremely wide. See, e.g.,
South East Chicago Comm'n v. HUD, 488 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1973). HUD made a
decision to maintain a commitment to a federally subsidized housing project, based
on the conclusions that I) the project would probably be integrated when rented, 2)
even if not, no significant impact on local stability or on racial concentration of the
area would result, and 3) the project was needed by low-income residents of the area.
The Seventh Circuit held that these considerations alone proved that HUD did not
make its decision in ignorance of the particular facts of the situation. Id. at 1129-30.
See also Jones v. Tully, discussed in notes 32-34 and accompanying text supra.
74. See note 15 supra.
75. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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SO.7 6 King requires the federal government to develop more sensitive
mechanisms for defining and studying neighborhood characteristics
in those situations in which reliance on census tracts might violate the
federal policies of antidiscrimination and integration.
Larry Levin
76. For an excellent example of the many uses to which census data is put, see the
DATA USER NEWS, published by the Bureau of the Census. The publication regularly
describes programs undertaken by the Bureau in conjunction with federal agencies
and departments.
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